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Export or Perish. Can Internal Devaluation create enough good job growth in Southern Europe? 
 




During the early 2010s, creditor states and EU institutions demanded that the Southern states of the 
eurozone liberalize their labour markets to facilitate internal devaluation and export-led recoveries. With 
some variation, the Greek, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian governments responded complied. This 
article explains why such a strategy of internal devaluation within the eurozone might fail to produce 
adequate employment growth to put these countries on stable financial footing. It exploits variation in 
the timing and intensity of reforms to evaluate the record of the internal devaluation strategy. Our 
findings suggest that there is no linear relationship between internal devaluation and export-growth. 
Even where the latter has been impressive, dualism persists and the employment recovery has been 
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The literature on the eurozone crisis has documented the intense pressure exerted on Southern European 
governments to conform to dictates of the ‘troika’ of creditors made up of the European Commission, 
the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (Armigeon & Baccaro 2012; Blyth 
2013; Sacchi 2015; Guillen &Pavolini 2015). The strategy these institutions prescribed for Southern 
Europe had two main ingredients: fiscal consolidation (i.e. austerity) and structural reforms (i.e. 
liberalisation of markets, especially, labour markets). In Greece and Portugal, which were unable to 
refinance their sovereign debt, extensive fiscal and structural measures were imposed explicitly as a 
direct condition for external financial assistance in official memoranda of understanding. But even in 
Italy and Spain, which did not require sovereign bailouts, governments informally faced pressure from 
the ECB to institute similar measures as a condition for the central bank’s actions to stabilize bond 
markets (Sacchi 2015; Perez 2015; Brunnermeir, James &Landau 2018, pp. 96, 416-416).  
An extensive literature has discussed the effects of fiscal austerity in Southern Europe, with the latter 
including effects on income distributions and welfare states (see Ball 2013; Matsaganis 2013; Heins & 
de la Porte 2015; Pavolini et a. 2016; Engler & Klein 2015; Petmesidou & Glatzer 2015; Sacchi 2018; 
Perez & Matsaganis 2018). This literature shows that the pro-cyclical turn in fiscal policy started in 
2010 intensified recessions, increased job losses, reduced the path of output growth, and contributed to 
rising poverty and income inequality. In this article, our focus turns to the results of labour market 
reforms intended to facilitate internal devaluation in labour costs. We are particularly interested in 
understanding the implications of such labour market reforms for the character of employment recovery 
(or lack thereof) in Southern European states.  
A number of recent studies have focused on the ways in which recent labour market reforms have varied 
across Southern Europe (Picot & Tassinari 2017; Afonso 2019), how they changed the balance of power 
between labour unions and employers (Rathgeb & Tassinari 2017), and how vulnerable they eventually 
proved to policy reversal (Afonso & Bulfone 2019). By contrast, our intent here is to exploit the 
experiences of the four main Southern European member states of the eurozone (Greece, Portugal, Italy 
and Spain), including differences among them, to evaluate how well internal devaluation has worked as 
a strategy to promote labour market recovery within the eurozone. Just like fiscal austerity instituted in 
the midst of recession was justified at one point as ‘expansionary austerity’ that would boost confidence 
among international investors (Alesina & Giavazzi 2010), labour market reforms to facilitate downward 
wage flexibility were justified as part of an economic strategy. The internal devaluation such reform 
was intended to produce would take the place of nominal exchange rate devaluation, allowing the debtor 
states in the currency zone not just to balance their internal accounts by repressing internal demand for 
imports but also to recover through export-led growth. It has been suggested that the insistence that 
debtor states pursue this strategy was in fact guided by less noble objectives, such as ensuring that 
commercial banks in creditor states be paid in full for their holdings of peripheral public and private 
debt (Thompson 2015), or forcing debtor states to conform to a neoliberal agenda to weaken labour 
unions across the eurozone (Rathgeb & Tassinari 2017). Nonetheless, the promotion of labour market 




reforms to facilitate internal devaluation was based on – and justified by - a specific logic of economic 
adjustment and a particular vision of how these countries could exit the crisis fastest 
In the following sections, we first examine where the logic of internal devaluation may fall short by 
holding it up to the literature on post-industrial growth models. We draw on the recent literature on both 
structural reforms and growth models to explain why internal devaluation based on labour market 
deregulation would fail to produce the expected outcomes in Southern Europe. We suggest that such 
reforms, as instituted in some countries, may simply undercut recovery (we see some evidence of this 
in Greece). It may also exacerbate incentives for firms to regain competitiveness by exploiting the 
increased leeway for precarious employment – contrary to the argument that they would reduce dualism 
in labour markets - with negative consequences for the quality of employment as these economies return 
to growth. We then look at the economic and employment performance of Greece, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy in the wake of labour market reform, finding that there appears to be little relationship between the 
degree of internal devaluation and export or employment growth. We conclude by discussing how 
comparative political economy might help explain some of the paradoxical findings we observe. 
 
The logic of internal devaluation as a growth strategy for Southern Europe 
Over the past decade, the challenges of technological change, growing economic inequality, new 
competition from emerging economies and the financial shock of the Great Recession have led political 
economists to wonder whether the advanced economies will be able to adjust in ways that mitigate the 
negative consequences of those changes. This concern has been particularly strong with respect to 
Europe, where the post-war era had allowed the construction of generous social welfare states (at least 
to the West of the Iron Curtain). Among the eurozone countries, it was the so-called GIIPS (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) that suffered most from the Great Recession. The policy response in 
these countries was dictated, to various degrees, by conditions imposed on their governments in return 
for financial assistance, or by the ECB, which pressured governments to comply with economic reforms 
prior to stepping into sovereign debt markets in late 2011.  
When the eurozone debt crisis first spread from Greece to other member states in 2010, it was common 
to attribute the debtor states’ problems to a lack of ‘fiscal continence’ by their governments (see for 
instance Elliot 2010, and Boltho & Carlin 2013). Yet it soon became clear that prior to 2008 some of 
the countries facing difficulties (specifically Ireland and Spain) had actually run primary surpluses and 
steadily cut their public debt (which was the lowest in the currency zone to start). A new consensus thus 
emerged among European policy-makers that attributed the GIIPS’ predicament to a loss of 
competitiveness vis-à-vis both other eurozone economies and the rest of the world. This loss of 
competitiveness, measured typically in unit labour costs was, in turn, ascribed to extravagant credit 
growth (both public and private) and excessive wage increases in these countries. Although there is now 
substantial literature suggesting that this interpretation was highly skewed (see Perez 2019), at the time 




they originated from inefficient institutions and the decisions of local actors (governments, banks, 
unions) and therefore had to be addressed principally by their own governments. 
Creditor states and institutions demanded pro-cyclical fiscal austerity to reduce internal demand, along 
with structural reforms. Because the loss of competitiveness was attributed to labour costs, the main 
demand (as reflected in memoranda of understandings and ECB letters) was that governments liberalise 
labour markets to facilitate downward wage adjustments. The common formula asked of debtor state 
governments was that they reduce the strictness of employment protection, decentralize or deregulate 
wage bargaining, and cut social benefits. In the cases of Greece and Portugal, these measures featured 
prominently in the economic adjustment programmes signed with the Troika in 2010-2011. In the cases 
of Spain and Italy, they were stipulated in letters sent by the ECB to the two governments in 2011 while 
the central bank considered an extension of its bond purchase program (ECB 2014; Sacchi 2015; 
Pavolini et al. 2016; Brunnermeir, James & Landau 2018, pp. 414-416). 
The logic behind the strategy of internal devaluation was straightforward (see among others Asmussen 
2011, Trichet 2011, Draghi 2012). Following the launch of the common currency in 1999, so the 
argument went, Southern European states had run up substantial external deficits to finance public 
spending and wage growth at a lower cost than was possible prior to monetary union. When external 
lending came to a sudden stop in 2008, and given that eurozone member states did not have their own 
currencies to devalue in order to rebalance their external account, all they could do to halt rising 
unemployment was to engineer a fall in wages and prices by removing constraints on competition in 
labour and product markets. Deregulation would help firms cope with reduced domestic demand by 
competing more successfully in international markets. The surge in exports would have an expansionary 
effect, creating jobs and ending the recession. When growth via export expansion was restored at some 
indeterminate point in the future, wages would be able to rise again (first in exporting firms, then 
elsewhere in the economy). If, on the contrary, internal devaluation failed to happen and wages did not 
adjust to lower internal demand, the crisis would inevitably exact even greater costs in terms of job 
losses. In the jargon of economists, if the market did not adjust by price, it would do so by quantity (see 
De Grauwe 2013, pp. 154-155). As the president of the ECB put it in his 2014 speech at Jackson Hole, 
commitment to internal devaluation (or lack thereof) explained why Spain, where ‘nominal 
compensation per employee continued to rise until the third quarter of 2011’, had seen a 12 percentage 
point increase in unemployment, while in Ireland, where ‘downward wage adjustment began already in 
the fourth quarter of 2008 and proceeded more quickly’, unemployment rose less and began to fall earlier 
(Draghi 2014). 
The internal devaluation strategy was prescribed as the only way for eurozone debtor states to emulate 
the export-led growth of Germany and the Visegrád states (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia) which had grown through foreign direct investment serving the supply chains of German, 
French and even Italian manufacturers (Bohle & Greskovits 2012). The argument was also rooted in a 




employment protection and relatively centralised wage bargaining was a source of economic 
inefficiency and resource misallocation. Hence Mario Draghi’s comparison of Spain, where the most 
significant labour market deregulation measures were only implemented in 2012, and Ireland, which 
historically had lower levels of employment protection. Nevertheless, the insistence on internal 
devaluation also served other goals. It was thought that trade surpluses engineered through internal 
devaluation would allow these countries to repay their external debt without bringing into play the 
‘moral hazard’ attached to other ways by which eurozone imbalances might be addressed (for instance, 
the creation of debt mutualisation instruments to reassure bond markets, more aggressive reflation in the 
creditor states through fiscal stimulus, or ultimately the creation of a ‘transfer union’).  
 
Internal devaluation and the political economy literature on export-led growth 
The heavy focus on internal devaluation via labour market deregulation and austerity as a strategy for 
recovery in Southern Europe has been criticised from numerous quarters. To start with, prominent 
economists of all persuasions reached the conclusion that the eurozone crisis was primarily a financial 
crisis rather than a crisis of excessive public spending, and that it was driven not just by budget deficits 
but also by cross-border capital flows that fed private credit booms in the debtor states (Baldwin et al. 
2015) The external, current account deficits of the debtor states appear to have been principally the result 
of asymmetric demand shocks set off by monetary union, which created incentives for interbank credit 
flows to the eurozone’s periphery (Gaulier & Vicard 2013; Comunale & Hessel 2014; Hobza & Zeugner 
2014; Perez 2019). Accordingly, the notion that competitive wage devaluation was the only acceptable 
way to address debt imbalances (as opposed to, say, greater fiscal stimulus and risk sharing to stop 
contagion across the eurozone) rested on a misunderstanding of the sources of those cross-border 
imbalances. While structural reforms (of a certain type, as explained below) might contribute to more 
balanced growth in Southern Europe in the longer run, they were of little help as a remedy to the 
immediate causes of the crisis. 
The one-size-fits-all character of the labour market reforms advanced in Southern Europe as a response 
to their external deficits is also susceptible to criticisms that have been lodged against the indiscriminate 
promotion of structural reforms more generally. A recent review of the evidence by Campos, De Grauwe 
and Ji (2018) suggests that the effectiveness of structural reforms in promoting growth varies greatly 
depending on the ‘type of reform, timing, sequence, and political constraints’ (p. 1). The authors observe 
that labour market liberalisation is subject to the law of decreasing returns so that ‘at some level of 
flexibility it may not be worthwhile to go on with structural reforms aiming at increasing market forces 
even more. The return in terms of additional economic growth may be close to zero’ (pp. 4-5). There 
are two main reasons why reforms aimed at increasing competition in labour markets may have 
diminishing returns in advanced market economies: transaction costs may be too high, and constraints 
on employers may be beneficial for growth. The authors find that ‘too much flexibility in the form of 




find a negative relationship  between employment protection and economic growth appears to be non-
linear (pp. 6-7). The political economy of structural reforms is another constraint: ‘social and political 
unrest over perceived unfairness of the outcome of the reforms; changes in political regimes that lead to 
reversals in the structural reforms; political instability that reduces investment’ all represent spill-overs 
that led to less economic growth’ (pp. 8-9). 
The emphasis placed by Campos, De Grauwe and Ji (2018) on the negative implications of excessive 
flexibility for growth resonates with the Varieties of Capitalism literature, which postulates a positive 
relationship between employment protection and skill formation (Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice 
2001; Belot, Boone & van Ours 2007; Hartcourt & Wood 2007; Gaetani & Doepke 2016). On the other 
hand, Rodrik (2016) has shown that the record of structural reforms in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
during the 1980s and 1990s under the ‘Washington Consensus’ was quite disappointing, a fact widely 
recognised by the IMF by the time of the eurozone crisis. The lessons learned in these other settings 
were somehow ignored during the European debate over the reforms pressed upon Greece and other 
crisis-battered countries on the periphery of Europe. Indeed, Fitoussi & Saraceno (2013) have pointed 
out the strong kinship between the ‘Berlin consensus’ around internal devaluation in the eurozone and 
the earlier, partly abandoned ‘Washington Consensus’ on the benefits of structural reform through 
conditionality in market economies.  
The political economy literature offers additional reasons to be concerned about the long-term effects 
of internal devaluation in Europe. The recent literature on ‘growth models’ suggests that the 
performance of European economies when it comes to distributional outcomes has increasingly come 
to depend on whether growth is driven by external demand (‘export-led growth’) or internal demand 
(consumption and investment), and, if the latter, whether internal demand is sustained by a rising (or at 
least steady) wage share or fuelled by an expansion of private credit. Baccaro & Pontusson (2016) argue 
that, because export-led growth requires wage moderation or even stagnant real wages, it benefits those 
whose income derives principally from profits and dividends (as in Germany in recent decades). Wage-
led growth can slow the rise in inequality observed across advanced industrialised economies (as was 
the case in Sweden following the financial crisis of the 1990s). In contrast, demand may be unsustainable 
in the longer term if maintained through credit growth (as in the US and in the UK prior to 2007). 
Southern European countries, as well as France, are often thought to have relied historically on internal 
demand (‘demand-led growth’), allowing nominal wage growth and subsequently offsetting it by 
‘competitive devaluation’ (Hall 2012, p. 359; Iversen & Soskice 2018; Manow, Palier & Schwander 
2018). Whether or not this accurately describes the historical path of economic development in these 
countries, it ceased to be an option following monetary union. The insistence that debtor states adjust 
through internal devaluation may be seen as an attempt to force the Southern states onto a growth path 
similar to that followed by Central European states, in particular the Visegrád countries, which achieved 
an important measure of income convergence with Western Europe by attracting foreign firms to invest 




would place workers in the two peripheries of Europe in direct competition with each other for foreign 
investment. Mario Draghi’s comparison of Spain and Ireland, attributing Ireland’s earlier turn to growth 
– also driven by foreign investment – to the country’s quicker drop in unit labour costs appears to 
bespeak this idea. 
However, the literature on growth models in Europe also offers numerous reasons to suspect that neither 
the Irish experience nor that of the Visegrád countries vindicated the use of internal devaluation as a 
recovery strategy in Southern Europe. McDonnell and O’Farrell (2016) have shown that the early fall 
in unit labour costs in Ireland alluded to in Draghi’s 2014 speech had little to with labour market 
flexibility and far more with compositional shifts in the Irish economy and cuts in public sector wages. 
Indeed, most of the fall in aggregate unit labour costs was an artefact of the collapse of employment in 
the labour intensive (lower productivity) construction sector and the rise in employment in the 
technology sector. Brazys and Regan (2017) and Regan and Brazys (2018) also offers important insights 
regarding Ireland’s FDI-led export growth miracle and Ireland’s earlier employment recovery following 
the crisis. Rather than wage dynamics, they argue, the Irish growth model was the result of an intensive 
use of state ‘enterprise’ policy to boost the country’s attraction as an EU hub for American technology 
firms that relied heavily on the strategic use of very low corporate tax rates to attract foreign investment. 
The spectacular growth figures this model has recently produced can be misleading as foreign 
multinationals locate a disproportionate amount of their global profits in Ireland, thus making GDP 
vastly larger than GNP in the case of Ireland and large amounts of those profits return to foreign 
investors. This tax-haven strategy to attract FDI, Regan and Brazys suggest, has resulted in a dualistic 
economy in which technology sector employees –large numbers of which are foreign nationals attracted 
by high salaries in technology sectors – benefit at the expense of locals whose fate in the labour and 
housing markets has proven far more vulnerable.  
Other analyses suggest that the success of the Visegrád countries with export-led growth is also unlikely 
to be replicable in Southern Europe. Bohle and Greskovits (2012) show that the ‘depend growth’ model 
these countries pursued - based heavily on FDI in manufacturing by German, Dutch and Italian investors 
- resulted from the particular combination of asset privatisation during the post-communist transition, 
the pursuit of neoliberal policies aimed at meeting EU accession demands, and geographic proximity – 
again, a very particular set of historical circumstances. Furthermore, while both corporate tax rates and 
wage and social expenditures started out lower in these countries than in Southern Europe, all of the 
Visegrád countries experienced very fast growth in unit labour costs as FDI-led growth advanced. Bohle 
(2018) points out that the high concentration of foreign ownership also created serious state legitimation 
problems in countries such as Hungary and Slovakia. This, she argues, became a major impetus for the 
spread of xenophobic nationalism in the region, in particular once governments ran out of room to 
compensate losers of the FDI dependent growth model by expanding contributory pensions. 
Other cases of successful export-led growth in the EU, such as that of Germany or Sweden, have been 




measures required to produce rapid internal devaluation in Southern Europe. The combination of wage 
moderation and productivity increases in Germany and Sweden, for instance, took place in a context of 
strong unions that were able to extract commitments from employers to preserve jobs in exchange for 
limiting wage growth (Hassel 2014; Johnston 2017). With some variation, there is evidence that South 
European labour confederations also pursued competitive wage-setting with considerable success, 
restraining wage growth across the economy in the run-up to the Euro, and in the case of Spain all the 
way to the financial crisis (Perez 2000, 2001; Posen & Gould 2007; Traxler 2009; Keune & Vandaele 
2013, pp. 4-7). The labour market reforms prescribed to, and largely carried out, in Southern Europe 
have weakened labour unions, reducing their role in wage setting and damaging their legitimacy. They 
have thereby also undermined some of the institutional conditions typically associated with export-led 
growth in the eurozone’s core. In addition, export-led growth in the European core is also premised on 
strong investment by employers in worker training. Yet such a commitment by companies (as well as 
workers) is less likely when employment protections are eased and it is easier for companies to adjust 
to market conditions by firing workers.1 
In the case of Germany, there is disagreement on the extent to which the export-led growth has been 
based on labour cost competitiveness, and on which features of the German institutional context were 
most important in producing wage moderation. Different authors suggest it was the 2000 corporatist 
agreement by unions and employers to allow wages to fall below productivity gains, the Hartz reforms 
of the early 2000s, the reorganisation of supply chains to the Visegrád countries, or the de facto 
decentralisation of wage bargaining to the firm level bargaining as a result of the labour unions’ fear of 
outsourcing to the East (see Rinne & Zimmermann (2013), Dustmann et al. (2014); Hassel 2014; Strom 
& Naastepad (2015a), and Bofinger (2016) for different views). Even if stagnant real wage growth in 
the service sector did play a role in repressing German domestic demand, thus contributing to current 
account surpluses (as argued by Baccaro & Tober 2017), it does not follow that the model ought to be 
emulated by other Eurozone member states. Indeed, Baccaro and Tober find that exports in other 
Eurozone countries, including Italy, are not as price or cost competitive as in Germany, a fact that may 
be explained by Germany’s higher share of exports to emerging markets.  
There is also the larger question of whether it is possible to achieve export-led growth with broadly 
comparable outcomes (in terms of employment levels and converging living standards) across a 
currency area as large as the eurozone. The economies of Southern Europe are specialised in sectors that 
cater to different markets (a reason to expect considerable asymmetries in external shocks). Moreover, 
they are integrated into global value chains differently from Germany, and also from each other. Dones 
                                                             
1 For instance, the theory and evidence on the relation between employer protection legislation and training 
provided by firms are ambivalent. Dolado, Ortigueira and Stucchi  et al. (2016) have shown that labour market 
reforms expanding temporary employment in Spain have resulted in employers providing less training. In 
contrast, Sulis, Bratti and Conti (2018) have found that higher levels of employment protection reduce firms’ 
incentives to invest in workers’ training, while another paper by the same authors (Bratti, Conti & Sulis 2018) 




Tacero, Heredero de Pablos, and Ruesga Benito (2017) have argued that countries like Spain or Italy, 
whose main exports are concentrated in medium-to high value added production (chemicals, 
automobiles or pharmaceuticals along with business services), are likely to see fewer employment spill-
over effects from exports to the rest of the economy because exports rely strongly on emerging market 
economies for inputs and intermediate goods. The authors contend that businesses in these particular 
sectors face strong pressure in favour of labour substitution, implying that a larger role for these sectors 
in the economy might produce lower overall employment growth. Indeed, in the case of advanced 
industrialised countries, the literature suggests that when countries upgrade their position in global value 
chains, average wages rise (benefitting high skilled workers most) but net overall employment appears 
to fall (Farole et al. 2016). It is therefore questionable whether exports alone can produce sufficient high-
quality employment growth to sustain living standards and welfare states. The failure to do so is almost 
certain to produce political legitimation crises like those observed in the dramatic transformation of 
national party systems in several of the Southern states. 
Summing up, while improving export performance is a legitimate policy goal - even an irrefutable one 
following a period of significant current account deficits - internal devaluation may well be an 
inappropriate strategy to respond to an employment crisis in Southern Europe. If the strategy were 
viable, in any case, we would expect those countries that have pursued more radical labour market 
measures to produce more significant reductions in unit labour costs and we would expect these 
reductions in turn to produce greater export-led employment growth. In addition, export growth would 
need to be linked with growth in stable (as opposed to temporary or precarious) employment. The 
following section explores the extent to which the experiences of the four European countries meet these 
expectations.  
 
3. Recovery in Southern Europe in the aftermath of structural reform 
There is a large and growing body of literature on labour market reform in Greece, Portugal, Italy and 
Spain (see among others Afonso & Bulfone 2019; Cardoso & Branco 2018; Theodoropoulou 2018; 
Sacchi 2018; Picot and Tassinari 2017; Cioffi & Dubin 2016; Pavolini et al. 2016; Moreira et al. 2015; 
ILO 2014, Matsaganis 2013; Constâncio 2011). What this literature shows is that labour market reforms 
were pursued with different levels of intensity, most aggressively in Greece, followed by Portugal and 
Spain, in that order, and that the intensity of reforms was indeed related to the extent of internal 
devaluation. By contrast, in Italy the most significant measures, those included in the Renzi 
government’s Jobs Act, were only implemented in 2015, at least three years later than the major reforms 
in the other three countries. The Italian reforms have also been the most balanced as they strengthened 
unemployment protection (which was particularly weak in Italy) at the same time that they lowered 
employment protections (Sacchi 2018; Picot & Tassinari 2017). Spain represents an intermediate case, 
but as Picot and Tassinari (2017) and Cioffi and Dubin (2016) have shown, the bargaining position of 




reform intensity is reflected in Figure 1, which presents the magnitude of change in employment 
protection legislation for regular employees through 2013, the last year for which the OECD index was 
updated2. Nonetheless, it should be added that firing costs were not the only major object of labour 
reforms; the reforms also involved important measures that weakened the position of unions in 
bargaining including the decentralisation of collective bargaining resulting in lower coverage rates.  
 
--Figure 1 about here-- 
 
What were the effects of these labour market reforms in Southern Europe? 
In terms of wages, there can be no doubt that structural reforms worked as advertised. Employees’ real 
compensation per hour worked in 2010-2013 fell cumulatively by 16.2 per cent in Greece, by 7.3 per 
cent in Portugal, by 5.7 per cent in Spain, and by 3.7 per cent in Italy. In contrast, in the Euro Area as a 
whole, the indicator went up, albeit very slightly (by 0.4 per cent). Wage moderation was also evident 
in employees’ hourly compensation, which was virtually zero in Greece, Portugal and Italy over the 
period 2013-2016, while it rose slightly in Spain (by a cumulative 1.7 per cent over the period, compared 
to 3.6 per cent in the Euro Area of 19 countries). 
Unit labour costs, which depend on both wages and productivity, also fell, though not in line with wages. 
Comparing peak to trough (pre- to post-structural reforms), nominal unit labour cost declined by 11.0 
per cent in Greece (in 2010-2016), 6.5 per cent in Portugal (in 2009-2014), and 5.7 per cent in Spain (in 
2009-2016). By contrast, they kept rising in Italy (by 8.3 per cent in 2008-2017, relative to 9.7 per cent 
in the Euro Area as a whole). On the whole, with the exception of Italy, labour cost competitiveness 
improved considerably in the South vis-à-vis the rest of the Euro Area, at least when measured in terms 
of unit labour cost that is at the level of economies as a whole. This is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
When we look at whether internal devaluation in turn resulted in export-led growth, the evidence is less 
compelling. In Greece, where internal devaluation was massive, export performance was disappointing, 
with the volume of goods and services exported between 2010 and 2013 rising, but by a mere 2.7 per 
cent. In Italy, where labour costs fell less than in the other three countries, exports increased more 
significantly, though still not as much as in the eurozone as a whole (by 8.4 per cent vs. 10.6 per cent 
over the same period). Exports grew fastest in Spain (by 13.2 per cent) and Portugal (by 18.4 per cent) 
in the 2010-2013 period. And this pattern persisted in the subsequent three-year period (2013-2016), 
with exports growing by 17.3 per cent in Portugal, followed by Spain (14.6 per cent), then Italy (10.2 
                                                             
2 The OECD Employment Protection Legislation indices cannot capture all the subtleties of labour market 
regulation, as these often depend on how different aspects of labour law interact in each country. For this and 




per cent), and least in Greece (9.3 per cent) relative to a eurozone average of 14.4 per cent for the period. 
Nonetheless, exports did become the fastest growing sector of total demand in all four countries as 
domestic demand first collapsed and then stagnated.  
While internal devaluation failed to produce consistent export-growth, its success in kick-starting overall 
growth was even more equivocal. Once again, Portugal and Spain did better than Italy and Greece. 
However, in Portugal, where the fall in wages had been second only to that of Greece and the shift to 
exports was greatest, cumulative GDP growth was only 4.3 per cent in 2013-2016. By contrast, in Spain, 
where internal devaluation had been less dramatic than in Portugal and export performance less 
spectacular, the economy grew twice as fast (8.3 per cent over the same period). Overall growth was 
sluggish in Italy (+1.9 per cent over the three-year period) and virtually non-existent (+0.2 per cent) in 
Greece. 
Most troubling, however, is the record of internal devaluation as an engine of job growth. In Greece, net 
job creation3 during the recovery (2013-2017) made up for only 21 per cent of the net job destruction 
during the Great Recession and the eurozone crisis (2008-2013). In Spain and Portugal, the equivalent 
ratio was 50 per cent and 57 per cent respectively. By contrast, in Italy, where the labour market reforms 
were delayed and wages had fallen far less, the ratio was 73 per cent. In the Euro Area of 19 member 
states, more jobs were added in 2013-2017 than were lost in 2008-2013 (a ratio of 106 per cent). Yet in 
Portugal and Spain, which have received a great deal of favourable attention (OECD 2018, pp. 221-
226), high unemployment has persisted in spite of internal devaluation and continues to be the principal 
cause of poverty and inequality. Indeed, the total number of workers in employment4 (shown in Figure 
3) remained lower in 2017 than it had been in 2008 in all four countries. And yet Italy, where internal 
devaluation was delayed and least intense, the net loss in jobs over the period was the lowest of the four 
countries. By the end of 2018, the number of employed persons was still lower than it had been in 2008, 
by 13 per cent in Greece, six per cent in Spain, three per cent in Portugal, but a mere 0.5 per cent in 
Italy. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
                                                             
3 Note that job creation and job destruction take place simultaneously at all times. The difference between the 
two is ‘net job creation’ (or, when it is negative, ‘net job destruction’). Note also that, strictly speaking, since it 
is possible for a worker to hold more than one job at the same time, changes in the number of workers in 
employment (as reported in the text) need not be identical to changes in the number of jobs. 
4 Since the size of Southern European workforces has changed significantly (and differently) in recent years, the 
number of workers employed (or, arguably, of hours worked) is a better indicator of job growth than the 
employment (or unemployment) rate. The decline in fertility is one reason for that. The rise of migration out of 
Southern Europe is another. The combination of both, and with migration into Southern Europe, has resulted in 
shrinking populations in Greece and Portugal (by -3.3 per cent and -2.5 per cent respectively in 2010-2017), and 
a stagnant population in Spain (+0.1 per cent over the same period). In Italy, the effect of immigration more than 
offset that of emigration and low fertility (+2.4 per cent in 2010-2017). In the EU as a whole, the population 




The employment recovery in Southern Europe following the labour market reforms looks even more 
disappointing when we compare numbers of hours worked at different points in time rather than the 
number of workers employed. The share of full-time work in total employment actually declined over 
the period. While still less widespread than in the rest of Europe, part-time work gained in importance 
in all four countries, especially between 2008 and 2013. In 2017, the share of part-time employment was 
18.5 per cent in Italy, 14.9 per cent in Spain, 9.7 per cent in Greece, and 8.9 per cent in Portugal (up 
from its 2008 level by around 4.4 percentage points in Italy and Greece, 3.4 in Spain, and a mere 0.1 
percentage point in Portugal). The EU average was 19.4 per cent in 2017, up from 17.5 per cent in 2008. 
Most significantly, the percentage of part-time workers involuntarily employed as such is considerably 
higher than in the rest of the eurozone. They represent 70 per cent in Greece, 62 per cent in Spain, 61 
per cent in Italy and 36 per cent in Portugal, compared to 11 per cent in Germany or 7 per cent in the 
Netherlands. As a percentage of all employed, those in part-time work only because they could not find 
a full-time job rose between 2008 and 2017 from 5.8 per cent to 11.6 per cent in Italy, 4.2 per cent to 
9.1 per cent in Spain, 2.4 per cent to 6.8 per cent in Greece, and 3.5 per cent to 4.2 per cent in Portugal. 
In the EU as a whole, the rise in involuntary part-time work was less dramatic (from 4.5 per cent in 2008 
to 5.1 per cent in 2017). 
Compounding the trend towards involuntary part-time work, the relaxation of employment protection 
for indefinite workers has also failed to limit the tendency to resort to fixed-term contracts across 
Southern Europe. This is particularly striking when we consider that labour market dualism (between 
‘insiders’ on permanent contracts and ‘outsiders’ on temporary contracts) was one of the main 
justifications offered domestically for labour market reform. The share of temporary jobs in Southern 
Europe fell during the recession because workers on temporary contracts were cut first. Yet as growth 
returned, this share rose again. By the end of 2017, the share of temporary workers in total employment 
was highest in Spain (26.8 per cent) and in Portugal (22.0 per cent), albeit below its 2008 level (29.2 per 
cent and 22.8 per cent respectively). In Italy, it rose from 13.3 per cent in 2008 to 15.5 per cent in 2017. 
By contrast, the share of temporary employees in Greece remained largely unchanged over the period 
(from 11.6 per cent to 11.4 per cent), as it did in the EU as a whole (14.1 per cent and 14.3 per cent in 
2008 and 2017 respectively). Yet, as we have seen, Greece is also the country where the employment 
recovery has been weakest.  
Temporary employment and involuntary low-intensity work would not be such a great policy concern 
if workers moved smoothly from temporary to permanent jobs, and if temporary workers lived in the 
same households as permanent workers. But temporary work seems to cluster in pockets of poverty – 
as evidenced by the fact that in-work poverty throughout Europe was three times higher among 
temporary workers than among permanent workers (Spain: 23.1 per cent vs 7.3 per cent; Italy: 22.5 per 
cent vs 7.8 per cent; Greece: 14.8 per cent vs 4.7 per cent). Portugal seemed to be an exception, with a 
poverty rate of ‘only’ 11.4 per cent for temporary employees in 2017, compared to 6.4 per cent for 




year). Nonetheless, the proportion of people in severe material deprivation ten years after the onset of 
the crisis remained very high by recent historical standards in all four countries.  
These figures, however, tend to understate the drama experienced in the Southern Europe, as poverty 
figures are based on a threshold of 60 per cent of median equivalent household disposable incomes. 
When incomes drop quickly over a short period of time, that threshold drops at the same time; hence, in 
an acute recession, yearly poverty figures can hide the real fall in living standards. Eurostat offers an 
‘anchored poverty’ rate by holding the poverty threshold constant at the income level at which it stood 
in 2008 to show the share of people who would be poor according to pre-crisis standards. This measure 
rose far more significantly in the 2008-2013 period. In the Euro Area as a whole, it went from 16.1 per 
cent to 20.0 per cent. Although it then fell again, it still remained above its 2008 level in 2017 (at 17.7 
per cent). In Southern Europe, however, the anchored poverty rate skyrocketed in Greece (from 20.1 per 
cent in 2008 to 44.3 per cent in 2013), increased sharply in Spain (from 19.8 per cent to 28.1 per cent) 
and Italy (from 18.9 per cent to 25.1 per cent), and somewhat less dramatically in Portugal (from 18.5 
per cent to 22.3 per cent). By 2017, anchored poverty had fallen below its 2008 level only in Portugal 
(18.3 per cent), remained close to its crisis peak in Spain (26.5 per cent) and Italy (23.9 per cent) and 
had risen even further in Greece (to 46.3 per cent)5. 
The emerging picture is that the labour market reforms carried out in the four countries failed to produce 
the kind of employment recovery needed to counter the heightened precarity of living conditions. This 
conclusion is confirmed by OECD estimates of the expected monetary loss associated with becoming 
and remaining unemployed, as a share of previous earnings (Figure 4). Between 2007 and 2016, this 
loss rose threefold in Greece and Spain, twofold in Italy, and less starkly in Portugal. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
In other words, efforts to pursue economic adjustment by way of labour market deregulation do not 
appear to have produced either consistent export growth or the kind of success in job creation we might 
have expected from internal devaluation. At the end of the day, the outcomes across Southern Europe 
appear to range from the Greek economy’s continued failure to recover, to the more successful cases of 
Spain and Portugal where employment remains lower than it was prior to the crisis, dualism has been 
exacerbated rather than reduced – with significant numbers of people having fallen into poverty either 
because of persisting unemployment or in-work poverty due to increasing periods of precarious work - 
and job market insecurity has increased substantially. 
                                                             
5 Income inequality also increased in the 2008-2013 period, except in Portugal. Looking at both the Gini 
coefficient and the S80/S20 income quintile share ratio (the latter measuring the disposable incomes of the 
richest 20 per cent as a multiple of the incomes of the poorest 20 per cent of the population), shows that in the 
2013-2017 period inequality developed differently in each country: it kept rising in Spain, remained close to its 




Why did internal devaluation and the increasing export orientation fail to produce growth in non-
precarious employment in Southern Europe?  
The overall labour market outcomes described above raise the question of why the optimistic theory of 
internal devaluation expounded by Mario Draghi at Jackson Hole in 2014 does not seem to be working 
in Southern Europe. The most common response offered is that net employment growth would have 
been even worse in the absence of the labour market reforms pursued and the downward wage flexibility 
achieved. This is the argument made by Domenech, Garcia and Ulloa (2016),  Izquierdo et al. (2017) 
and Salas (2018) for Spain and by the OECD (2017) for Portugal. There is some evidence from Greece 
that internal devaluation helped stabilise the labour market by providing a lifeline to small and medium-
sized firms which would otherwise have gone under (Pelagidis & Mitsopoulos 2014; see also Izquierdo 
et al. 2017). It might also be argued that it is simply too soon to tell, and that reforms take time to bear 
fruits. Yet given that it has been over six years since the bulk of the reforms were passed, this type of 
response casts serious doubt on the effectiveness of internal devaluation as a remedy to a jobs crisis.  
Greece, where the minimum wage was cut by 22 per cent (32 per cent for workers aged 24 or less) in 
February 2012, offers a particularly dramatic example. Even if reforms there helped arrest the massive 
rise in unemployment once the crisis was underway, arguably stabilising the labour market at a lower 
level of employment, they clearly failed to set the basis for a recovery in employment. In the case of 
Spain, the most radical reform package in 2012, which included the elimination of the administrative 
approval threshold for collective layoffs and put the burden of proof on the worker when claiming unfair 
dismissal, was followed by a substantial rise in mass layoffs and a further drop in jobs benefitting from 
indefinite contracts. But again, the contribution of the reforms to recovery are questionable. A recent 
analysis (Jorrin 2018) shows that, even if the downward wage adjustment made possible by the 
decentralisation of bargaining spared some jobs during the downward phase of the cycle, the reforms 
have had a negligible effect on total employment recovery after 2015; indeed, they seem to be 
perpetuating if not exacerbating the reliance on atypical job contracts (temporary and part time contracts 
with very low wages) both of which seem to be characterised by more precarious conditions than in the 
past (either in terms of duration or relative pay). This also is the case in Portugal, where the reforms 
appear to have lowered employment conditions across the board and created a new category of ultra-
precarious jobs (Cardoso & Branco 2018).  
What is perhaps most striking, however, is that these labour market outcomes (failure of full recovery 
in total employment and persistent, if not rising, precarity of employment conditions) have been entirely 
compatible with a massive rise in exports in the cases of Portugal and Spain. In all four countries, gross 
revenues from exports as a percentage of GDP rose substantially between 2009 and 2017: from 19 per 
cent to 33 per cent in Greece, 23 per cent to 31 per cent in Italy, 23 per cent to 35 per cent in Spain, and 
27 to 43 per cent in Portugal. In the case of Greece, this reflects the fact that the export sector was less 
hard hit than the economy as a whole. However, in all three of the other countries, but in particular Spain 




not, as is sometimes thought, of tourism revenues. Nonetheless, and despite a sharp fall in the 
contribution of financial and insurance services to the external account, there has also been substantial 
rise in non-tourism service exports, in particular business services which typically involve fairly high 
skilled workers in areas such as scientific research, engineering, architecture, and design, as well as 
computer and legal services.  As Table 1 shows, manufacturing, along with professional and scientific 
services are also the sectors that have experienced the greatest growth in output since 2012.   
 
 Table 1 here  
 
But what has happened with employment by economic sector in these countries? The World Bank’s 
Labour Content of Exports data for 2011 (the last year covered) suggests that exports in Southern Europe 
in that year, vis-à-vis exports in core eurozone countries, were relatively labour intensive, albeit 
dominated by medium to high skill activities. However, as Table 2 shows, employment performance in 
manufacturing has been particularly poor in all four countries despite the expansion in manufacturing 
exports, in particular in Portugal and Spain and to a lesser extent in Italy. Indeed, the number of persons 
employed in manufacturing has decreased substantially (as it has in other sectors such as construction 
and finance which shrunk as a result of the crisis).  Sectors that have done relatively well in adding to 
employment are the Information and Communication sector and the Professional, Scientific and 
Technical Activities sectors. However, the overall weight these sectors is relatively low so that 
employment created by these service exports cannot compensate for the low employment creation that 
has accompanied the rise in manufacturing exports. 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
As Table 3 shows, it is predominantly lower wage service sectors that have seen employment growth 
since the trough of the crisis in three of the Southern states (the data is not available for Greece). Only 
one of these sectors (accommodation and food services) contributes to the growth of export revenues. 
The others (personal, domestic, and security services) all fall within the category of non-tradable 
services. Computer and information services in Spain, which has become an important service export 
sector, is the exception to this general pattern. But it should be noted that although these service export 
jobs involve high skilled workers and higher wages than the other service sectors on the list, they have 
also been marked by high levels of atypical or precarious employment contracts (Consejo Económico y 
Social 2019).  
The disconnect between rising export revenues and employment trends across sectors in countries such 
as Spain and Portugal is striking and serious questions about the wisdom of relying on labour market 
deregulation and internal devaluation to address the persisting weakness in Southern Europe’s labour 
markets. Take the case of Greece, which, as already noted, saw the most radical internal devaluation 
with very little to show for it in terms of economic recovery. Indeed, the OECD’s Entrepreneurship at a 




out of all firms rose substantially over the period 2011 to 2014 (in particular in Spain), in Greece this 
percentage actually declined over the period from 15 per cent to ten per cent. This suggests that the 
collapse of domestic demand – which was accentuated by internal devaluation – was so great that it also 
put large number of firms with export experience out of business.  
However, the Spanish and Portuguese experiences are also worrisome as they suggest that even where 
export growth is a success in the eurozone’s periphery, it may have other consequences. The Southern 
European countries are often thought to share problems in the area of skills formation, as reflected in 
relatively high school dropout rates and poor average scores on the OECD’s adult skills performance 
evaluations. Yet such averages also hide important differences by age (among younger groups, skills 
performance scores are much higher). Moreover, high rates of emigration by those with vocational and 
tertiary education make it unlikely that skills per se offer an explanation for differences in national 
employment levels. Indeed, as the Spanish case shows, labour market liberalization can create a situation 
where even skilled workers involved in service export jobs are forced to take precarious employment 
and pay conditions. In the case of manufacturing it is also questionable whether the internal devaluation 
of wages made any substantial contribution to export growth. Storm & Naastepad (2015, pp. 966-967), 
for instance, have shown that labour costs account for a low share of manufacturing gross output prices 
(16 per cent in Italy and Spain, 15 per cent in Greece and 17 per cent in Portugal). Nonetheless, Dones 
Tacero, Heredero de Pablos & Ruesga Benito (2017) show that those Spanish manufacturing firms that 
are most successful in exporting are also those most engaged in labour substitution, and export growth 
in Spanish manufacturing has low spill-over effects on overall employment because of its reliance on 
imports of intermediate goods from emerging markets. Although exporting firms in Italy concentrate 
slightly more on capital goods than in Spain, they also increasingly rely on outsourcing lower skilled 
work to emerging markets, Thus Iapadre (2011, p. 20) expresses similar concerns about the possible 
trade-offs between export specialisation in high value-added production and overall employment growth 
in Italy. If this is the consequence of the particular way Southern European states are integrated into 
global value chains, an even greater share of manufacturing exports in GDP may be directly linked to 




In response to the eurozone crisis, creditor states and institutions pushed for a strategy of internal 
devaluation based on labour market liberalisation in Southern Europe. With different intensities and 
timing, this strategy was in fact pursued in Southern Europe and did deliver internal devaluation. 
However, our analysis suggests that there were numerous problems with this strategy. The reforms did 
produce internal devaluation in labour costs in all but Italy where the most significant measures were 
delayed until 2015. Yet Greece, which saw the largest internal devaluation, has also had the least 




this has not helped produce enough jobs to make up for previous employment losses. Rather than end 
labour market segregation, dualism has persisted, and high numbers of people are experiencing even 
more precarious work conditions and a greater sense of job insecurity. Emigration has also been a 
significant result of the combination of austerity, precarious employment conditions, even during the 
recent recovery. The rise in in-work poverty has persisted even in Spain, which has seen the most 
substantial recovery in growth (although only after a level of job destruction second only to that of 
Greece). We suspect that export-led growth has not produced a broader recovery in the labour market 
in part because employment spill-overs tend to accrue to the producers of intermediate goods abroad; in 
addition, export firms, at least in manufacturing, are also particularly prone to labour substitution. 
Indeed, the Spanish experience suggests that the increasing export orientation of a larger share of 
Spanish business may accentuate the trade-off between productivity growth and the proclivity of firms 
to take on permanent workers. On the other hand, the labour market performance of Italy, where 
measures to liberalise employment took the longest to implement and where the pace of fiscal 
consolidation was also slower, does not look as bad as is often thought when we take a closer look at 
the evolution of employment in the other three countries. 
What is most worrisome, however, is that it is not yet possible to have a full understanding of many of 
the consequences of internal devaluation – such as the depth and length of the recession in these 
countries and demographic effects such as emigration and birth rates. Without more substantial 
employment growth and the return of better pay and employment conditions, welfare states are likely to 
be over-burdened and pension systems less sustainable. It also remains unclear how present levels of 
poverty, unemployment, and job precariousness will affect the future strategies of investment by 
individuals and firms in skill formation. The growth model literature tells us that high levels of public 
investment in education, health and infrastructure – one of the first casualties of fiscal austerity in 
Southern Europe – are required to attain the more egalitarian outcomes still appreciated in some (not 
all) of Nordic states. Without other changes in the economic governance of the eurozone, the strategy 
of internal devaluation through labour market liberalisation does not appear to offer a sustainable growth 
model for the Southern states.  
Lastly, as other critics of structural reforms have noted, the types of reforms carried out in Southern 
Europe have also had important political consequences. Southern Europe is not alone in this, but Greece, 
Spain, and Italy have all witnessed dramatic changes in their party systems with, in some cases, serious 
challenges to existing democratic institutions. Even if labour market reforms are not always at the heart 
of the passions that inspire populist revolts of a nationalist nature, we suspect that the weak employment 
recoveries and the heightened economic insecurity to which they have contributed make Southern 
Europe more, rather than less, likely to follow down a populist path. It is beyond the scope of this article 
to draw these connections in individual country cases. However, the weak labour market recoveries 
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